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ABSTRACT
This Article addresses whether strong artificial
intelligent robots (“AI”) should receive real property
rights. More than a resource, real property promotes selfrespect to natural persons such as human beings. Because
of this distinction, this Article argues for limited real
property rights for AIs. In developing this proposition, it
examines three hypotheticals of a strong AI robot in
various forms of real property ownership.
The first hypothetical determines whether an AI could
work as an agent in real property transactions. As robots
currently act as agents in various capacities, the
groundwork exists for an AI to enter this role. The second
hypothetical considers whether an AI could own property
in a manner similar to a corporation. In this instance, an
AI would own the property in its name, but generate wealth
for its shareholders and have oversight by natural persons.
Corporations can acquire property as artificial persons, so
too AIs could meet similar legal requirements. As such, the
law should allow such ownership rights to AIs. The third
hypothetical delves into whether an AI should own property
*
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outright like a natural person. After describing potential
reasons for this approach, this Article explains why legal
and policy-based arguments weigh against this extension of
property rights to AIs. Instead, any possibility of an AI
owning property like a natural person should come from
Congress, not the courts.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine in the year 2040, Google announces a breakthrough in
the field of artificial intelligence:1 the first autonomous artificial
1

Artificial intelligence has been advancing faster than many scientists
predicted. Most recently, Google’s computer program, AlphaGo, defeated a
master of the complex game called “Go.” This victory of machine over man
seemed impossible less than twenty years ago but now is happening. See George
Johnson, To Beat Go Champion, Google’s Program Needed a Human Army,
N.Y. T IMES (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/05/science/
google-alphago-artificial-intelligence.html (“‘It may be a hundred years before a
computer beats humans at Go—maybe even longer,’ Dr. Piet Hut, an
astrophysicist and Go enthusiast at the Institute for Advanced Study in
Princeton, N.J., told me in 1997 . . . . That was the prevailing wisdom.”). Mr.
Johnson commented in his 1997 article that:
To play a decent game of Go, a computer must be endowed
with the ability to recognize subtle, complex patterns and to
draw on the kind of intuitive knowledge that is the hallmark of
human intelligence . . . [and defeating a human Go champion]
will be a sign that artificial intelligence is truly beginning to
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intelligent robot is born.2 As a strong AI, this entity is not simply a
tool used to achieve some other entity’s goals; rather, he possesses
a mind of his own.3 The Certified Living Intelligent Valued
become as good as the real thing.
Id. Mr. Johnson realized that is not the case. Id. However, these technological
leaps strengthen the argument that futuristic theories of artificial intelligence
may arrive sooner than people could imagine. After all, defeating humans at
complex board games is just the beginning for artificial intelligence. See Tom
Simonite, How Google Plans to Solve Artificial Intelligence, MIT T ECH. REV.,
Mar. 31, 2016, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601139/how-google-plansto-solve-artificial-intelligence/. As the leader of the team of roughly 200
computer scientists and neuroscientists at Google’s DeepMind, the Londonbased group behind the AlphaGo software, Demis Hassabis explained that these
games are early checkpoints aimed at “solving intelligence, and then using that
to solve everything else.” Id. Strong artificial intelligent robots solve the
question of how to expand intelligence to non-humans.
2
Debate still exists over whether a strong AI robot could ever be created.
John R. Searle, Minds, Brains and Programs, 3 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 349, 417–
57 (1980); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences,
70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1236 (1992) (“John Searle questioned the relevance of
Turing’s Test with another thought experiment, which has come to be known as
the Chinese Room. Imagine that you are locked in a room. Into the room come
batches of Chinese writing, but you don’t know any Chinese. You are, however,
given a rule book, written in English, in which you can look up the bits of
Chinese, by their shape. The rule book gives you a procedure for producing
strings of Chinese characters that you send out of the room. Those outside the
room are playing some version of Turing’s game. They are convinced that
whatever is in the room understands Chinese. But you don’t know a word of
Chinese, you are simply following a set of instructions (which we can call a
program) based on the shape of Chinese symbols. Searle believes that this
thought experiment demonstrates that neither you nor the instruction book (the
program) understands Chinese, even though you and the program can simulate
such understanding. More generally, Searle argues that thinking cannot be
attributed to a computer on the basis of its running a program that manipulates
symbols in a way that simulates human intelligence.”). DAVID COLE, The
Chinese Room Argument, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2015/entries/chinese-room/ (“[S]ince its appearance in 1980 the Chinese
Room argument has sparked discussion across disciplines. Despite the extensive
discussion there is still no consensus as to whether the argument is sound.”).
However, this Article’s premise assumes the development of strong AI.
3
Searle, supra note 2, at 417 (“According to weak AI, the principal value
of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool.
For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous

442

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 11:5

Extraterrestrial (“Clive”) has the ability to think for himself.4
Clive’s baseline intelligence replicates the cognitive states of a
human’s mind, such as the ability to generate new knowledge.
Although Clive’s existence raises a host of legal, ethical, and
religious questions, this Article focuses on a narrow issue: the legal
and policy-based implications of allowing Clive to own real
property.
Part I of this Article describes the moral theory of real property
and explores important principles of real property ownership. After
examining these principles, Part II provides three hypotheticals of
a strong AI robot involving itself in real property ownership. In the
first hypothetical, Clive is an agent for a principal, working to
facilitate home ownership.5 In the second hypothetical, Clive owns
the property in his name but with human oversight/guardianship.6
In the third, Clive purchases the property outright.7 In addressing
these hypotheticals, this Article suggests that courts should grant
ownership rights to Clive similar to a corporation, but that
extending property rights held by natural persons to Clive should
be left to Congress.
I. BACKGROUND
Property law in the United States currently allows both natural
and artificial persons to own property.8 As a natural person, Bill
and precise fashion. But according to strong AI, the computer is not merely a
tool in the study of the mind; rather, the appropriately programmed computer
really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be
literally said to understand and have other cognitive states. In strong AI, because
the programmed computer has cognitive states, the programs are not mere tools
that enable us to test psychological explanations; rather, the programs are
themselves the explanations.”).
4
For ease of reading, “Clive” will be referred to with male pronouns.
However, Clive is an artificial intelligent entity without a gender.
5
See infra Part II.A.
6
See infra Part II.B.
7
See infra Part II.C.
8
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 1-2-1 (2016) (stating that there are two
classes of persons, natural and artificial, and that corporations are artificial
persons, whose rights are created by law). “Persons” have been defined as an
entity that has legal rights and duties. See J OHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE
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Gates can buy a home in Atlanta, GA.9 Coca-Cola Company, as an
artificial person, can nevertheless buy real property in Atlanta;10
possessing this right through legal personhood. Originally,
corporate personhood granted an exclusivity right to the
corporation, where such corporation may have a monopoly over its
area of business.11 However, these monopolistic privileges have
since ended.12 Instead, states have created general laws that allow
greater ease in forming a corporation or other artificial persons,
such as a limited liability company.13
Even with this expansion of artificial personhood,14 real
property still holds a special role in society for natural persons.
Sections A and B of this Part provide a basic overview of this
special role through the lens of legal theory and principles,
respectively.
A. The Moral Theory of Real Property
Real property law is not simply about ownership. Theories of
morality have contributed to this field of law.15 The traditional
view of property rights is that “they promote and protect the selfrespect and autonomy for individuals within given societies.”16
AND S OURCES OF THE LAW 27 (Roland Gray & Phillip Thomas eds., 1997)
(stating that “person” usually means a human being, “but the technical legal
meaning of a ‘person’ is a subject of legal rights and duties”).
9
See generally GA. CODE ANN. § 44.
10
While zoning laws may limit property ownership, this Article focuses on
the ability to buy real property and not limitations of zoning laws. See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 36-66.
11
1 J EROME KAPLAN, GEORGIA CORPORATIONS , L IMITED P ARTNERSHIPS
& LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 2:2 (2015–2016).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
The notion of artificial personhood existed prior to Christopher Columbus
discovering the Americas. Id.
15
For example, confiscating property during wartime violates moral theory.
See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 255 (1796) (declaring confiscation of property
in time of war to be incompatible with “principles of justice,” “the dictates of
the moral sense,” and “of right reason and natural equity”).
16
Larry May, Corporate Property Rights, 5 J. OF B US. ETHICS 225, 225
(1986).
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They are not simply about excluding others, but rather are “the
legal framework of a free and democratic society that treats each
person with equal concern and respect.”17 This ideology of equality
and respect creates a human component to real property theory.18
Because of this link between property ownership and morality,
scholars have argued as to whether corporations deserve property
rights.19 An important aspect of this argument is whether a
corporation is moral.20 The issue of binding morality to
corporations is an ongoing debate.21 The rise of corporate social
responsibility suggests that corporations are moral, but that these
notions of morality are newer concepts and remain only a means to

17

Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J.
1287, 1301 (2014). Other property rights did not have that same legal
background that concerned itself with these grander ideas of democracy and
equality.
18
Because corporations are more tangentially connected to humans,
scholars argue against their increased property rights. See May, supra note 16, at
231 (“I would propose that we demote the status of corporate property rights in
our society, making the list of possible restrictions on corporate property reflect
the fact that this form of property does not have the moral support traditionally
believed to be true of other property claims. Such a change in legal theory would
not take much effort, especially after the fiction of the corporate ‘person’ was
dispensed with.”).
19
See id.
20
See Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations are People Too: A MultiDimensional Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & F IN. L. 97, 118–31 (2009) (explaining the arguments for and against
the idea of corporate moral personhood).
21
Some philosophers argue that because a corporation lacks the capacity to
feel emotion as a human, it cannot be moral. Id. at 121–25. However, according
to philosopher Peter French, corporations possess morality due to intentionality.
Id. at 127 (“Philosopher Peter French believes it is a corporation’s intentionality
that gives it the status of a moral person because intentionality is both a
necessary and sufficient condition for moral personhood.”). While an intentional
stance can be important to understand morality, such an approach does not
adequately address moral theory in connection to real property. Further,
opposing philosophers to this intentionality stance argue that “intentionality is
only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for moral personhood. The essential
component of moral responsibility that corporations lack is the capacity to feel
emotion.” Id. at 121. The AI would not feel emotion, so it would not be moral
under this theory.
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increase profitability.22 The moral tradition of real property has
always focused on the self-respect given to natural persons.
Because of the innately human element of self-respect attached to
property rights, the law protects such rights vigorously.23
B. Principles of Property Ownership
Although property rights are often described as a “bundle of
rights or things” bestowed to persons,24 this definition simplifies
the significance that humans attach to such rights. Instead, the
principles ascribed to real property law reflect the respect that
society places on it, and as such, extending these rights requires
serious deliberation. These principles arose from the common law,
the Constitution, and legislation.
Common law principles provide property owners with rights
and obligations.25 One important right for a property owner is the
right to exclude anyone from entering his property.26 A property
owner also has certain obligations that make him liable under the
law.27 Even with these rights and obligations, the common law
22

See Dylan Minor & John Morgan, CSR as Reputation Insurance: Primum
Non Nocere, 53 C AL. M GMT. REV. 40, 40 (2011) (“For many firms, the most
precious asset lies not on the balance sheet, nor in the human capital of the
workforce, but rather in its reputation. For instance, IBM’s reputation for being
an enterprise-friendly and efficient solutions provider has enabled it to beat
rivals for business over many years. McDonald’s reputation for being a familyfriendly and economical place to eat has sustained its market share in the face of
fierce competition from other chains. However, reputation can be a fragile thing.
Consider British Petroleum (BP) and its recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
While BP had for years invested in its sunburst logo and various ‘do good’ and
‘be green’ campaigns, its reputation quickly slipped away in the midst of
tragedy: its firm value was decimated by some $100 billion.”).
23
See infra Part I.B.
24
Singer, supra note 17, at 1288–90.
25
Id. at 1323; see also Javins v. First Nat’l Realty, 428 F.2d 1071, 1077
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (“In our judgment the common law itself must recognize the
landlord’s obligation to keep his premises in a habitable condition.”).
26
Singer, supra note 17, at 1294–95 (“We divide the world into things and
then allocate those things among owners, giving them the power to exclude
others from things they own as well as general powers to use them and transfer
them.”).
27
May, supra note 16, at 255 (“The Right-holder is entitled to exclude other
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originally had a laissez-faire approach to property ownership. For
the common law tradition, property ownership represented a
significant right with fundamental values attached to it.28 These
common law principles held true even through several revolutions,
and transitioned and expanded under the U.S. Constitution.
Constitutional principles increased natural persons’ rights. In
the face of British tyranny, the United States Constitution stated
“that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights which among these are
Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.”29 These constitutional
principles do not just control human interaction, but also how those
interactions occur—including the importance of scarcity of
resources in real property.30 The Fifth Amendment expressly
prohibits the taking of private property, without just
compensation.31 Because of this relationship, property law should
reflect our deepest values as espoused in the Constitution.32 As
stated previously, the liberal tradition of moral theory views real
property as a means to promote self-respect for individuals.33
Later congressional acts further sought to guard natural persons
and promote moral theory. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
guaranteed all citizens equal rights to real and personal property.34
The Public Accommodations Law of 1964 ensured that, regardless
of race, everyone had equal access to certain public
accommodations.35 The Fair Housing Act of 1968 forbade sellers
or renters from refusing a dwelling to any person based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.36 Additionally, state laws
members of the society from the property and the society is entitled to be
excluded from liability.”).
28
See Singer, supra note 17, at 1312.
29
U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. 8.
30
Singer, supra note 17, at 1299.
31
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
32
See Singer, supra note 17, at 1299 (“Property is not just about
information or complexity; it is about promoting ‘Life, Liberty and the Pursuit
of Happiness.’”).
33
See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
34
42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 1991).
35
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a (West 1964).
36
See generally Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3601.
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protect tenants from eviction, unless the landlord shows legitimate
cause.37
These common law, constitutional, and legislative principles
sought to protect natural persons’ real property. However, these
principles do not simply protect real property because of its
scarcity. Although the scarcity and power of exclusivity are vital
aspects of real property law, these principles focus on self-respect
for individuals.38 In fact, American law continues to encourage
these principles.39 Because of the moral principles tied to real
property ownership, this right must be carefully scrutinized before
it is extended to autonomous artificial intelligent entities like Clive.
For, in receiving the right to own real property, Clive would also
receive the right of exclusivity on a scarce resource that has
historic notions of human self-respect.
II. OWNERSHIP SCENARIOS FOR AI ROBOTS
The following three hypotheticals explore potential scenarios
through which Clive may involve himself in real property
ownership. The first hypothetical determines whether a potential
issue arises from Clive facilitating a property transaction as an
agent. This Section contends that robots are already acting as
agents under current agency law. The second hypothetical
addresses the possibility of Clive acquiring property rights like a
corporation. Although differences exist between Clive and a
37

See, e.g., Mark S. Dennison, Tenant’s Rights and Remedies Against
Retaliatory Eviction by Landlord, 45 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 375 (1998)
(“[M]any states have adopted landlord-tenant and ‘anti-eviction’ or ‘antireprisal’ statutes, with provisions that are specifically designed to protect
residential tenants from retaliatory eviction by landlords.”).
38
See supra notes 25–36 and accompanying text.
39
See, e.g., tax laws encourage home ownership through beneficial
deductions. See I.R.S., Tax Information for Homeowners, P UBLICATION 530
(Jan. 12, 2006), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p530.pdf; see also Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., America’s Homeownership Rate
Rises to 66.7 Percent Including Record Numbers of Black and Hispanic
Families (Apr. 21, 1999), http://archives.hud.gov/news/1999/pr99-69.html
(“[Homeowners] tend to be more involved in promoting strong neighborhoods
and good schools than renters.”).
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corporation, this Article concludes that Clive should receive this
type of property right—one with human oversight. The third
hypothetical evaluates the possibility of Clive owning property like
a natural person. In this situation, problems arise that, at least
currently, should prevent this method of ownership. As such, this
Article argues that courts should not grant real property rights like
a natural person to Clive because this presents a fundamental shift
that undermines the moral traditions tied to real property.
A. Facilitating Property Ownership as an Agent
Presume that Clive works for a real estate employer.40 Clive
may have an actual robot body and escort potential buyers to
homes; Clive may be software that conducts deals on behalf of his
employer. In either situation, he is not buying property for himself.
Instead, he is acting as a real estate agent for his employer.
Therefore, agency law governs Clive’s relationship.
The Restatement of Agency § 3.05 provides that “[a]ny person
may ordinarily be empowered to act so as to affect the legal
relations of another. The actor’s capacity governs the extent to
which, by so acting, the actor becomes subject to duties and
liabilities to the person whose legal relations are affected or to
third parties.”41 This definition provides that any person can be an
agent, and the capacity of his legal scope determines the potential
duties and liabilities to the principal and third parties.42 Under this
definition, however, Clive could not act as an agent to his
employer because he is not a “person” under the definition of
agency law.43
40

This real estate employer could be a natural person or an artificial person,
like the corporation Century 21.
41
RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.05 (2006).
42
See id.
43
See RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04(5) (“A person is (a) an
individual; (b) an organization or association that has legal capacity to possess
rights and incur obligations; (c) a government, political subdivision, or
instrumentality or entity created by government; or (d) any other entity that has
legal capacity to possess rights and incur obligations.”). Clive has yet to meet
any of these definitions, unlike a corporation, which is a legal entity created by
the government.
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Another issue with this definition involves scope of
employment. As stated above, a principal is liable for an agent so
long as the agent adheres to its scope of employment.44 The
Restatement describes software as mere tools that cannot work as
agents.45 However, the Restatement’s classification of robots does
not take into account the situations in which robots are already
acting in the capacity of an agent.46
In both case law and the real world, weak artificial intelligent
robots (i.e. no cognitive states, just tools) have already acted as
agents for their principals. In the two cases State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company v. Bockhorst47 and McEvans v.
Citibank, N.A.,48 the courts found that the respective companies
were liable to a third party for errors caused by their robotic
programs.49 In State Farm, the defendant, an insurance company,
had a computer that reinstated plaintiff’s insurance policy
retroactively.50 The court recognized that this was a computer
mistake, and human oversight erred by not finding it.51 This
computer error led to the plaintiff receiving a notice of renewal.52
Under the theory of apparent authority,53 the plaintiff received the
44

See RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.05.
See RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF AGENCY§ 1.04(5) cmt. e (“[A] computer
program is not capable of acting as a principal or an agent as defined by the
common law. At present, computer programs are instrumentalities of the persons
who use them. If a program malfunctions, even in ways unanticipated by its
designer or user, the legal consequences for the person who uses it are no
different than the consequences stemming from the malfunction of any other
type of instrumentality. That a program may malfunction does not create
capacity to act as a principal or an agent.”).
46
See infra notes 47–65 and accompanying text; see also Anthony J. Bella
Jr., Contracting with Electronic Agents, 50 EMORY L.J. 1047, 1047 (2001)
(“The use of computer technology to “make contracts” for humans is no longer
mere prospect but reality. Technology has developed that enables individuals to
use electronic agents to arrange exchanges without direct human intervention.”).
47
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Bockhorst, 453 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1972).
48
McEvans v. Citibank, N.A., 408 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1978).
49
See State Farm, 453 F.2d 533; McEvans, 408 N.Y.S.2d 870.
50
State Farm, 453 F.2d at 535.
51
Id. at 535–36.
52
Id. at 535.
53
RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006) (“Apparent authority
is the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a principal’s legal relations
45
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notice of renewal, so it was reasonable for him to believe that the
defendant reinstated his policy.54 While the defendant argued that
this computer error should not bind it, the Tenth Circuit held
otherwise.55 The court found that even though “the actual
processing of the policy was carried out by an unimaginative
mechanical device” the defendant was still liable for the plaintiff’s
policy.56 In this situation, the computer served as an agent for the
defendant.57
Similarly, in McEvans, the court found that the defendant’s
ATM machine created a bailment relationship with a customer
who deposited money in its ATM.58 This relationship ensured that
the defendant, a bank, would safeguard the customer’s funds.59
Because the defendant was unable to verify the steps of the
transaction between the ATM and customer, the defendant was
liable for the customer’s lost funds.60 While an ATM machine is
not advanced technology, it was able to act as an agent to the
defendant—it had the authority to receive money from third parties
on behalf of its employer, so the court found the principal, the
defendant, liable for the error.61
Although these cases involved rudimentary robotic tools
working for their companies and neither court classified them as
“agents,” these cases establish a framework for the future. The
courts could have found no liability for the defendants because no
human-agent caused the mistake, but instead, the courts found that
an error by a robotic tool creates liability for the principal. With
breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, this case law already
establishes that robots can create duties and liabilities between its
with third parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority
to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s
manifestations.”) (emphasis added).
54
See State Farm, 453 F.2d at 536.
55
Id. at 537.
56
Id.
57
See id. at 537.
58
McEvans v. Citibank, N.A., 408 N.Y.S.2d 870, 872–73 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1978).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
See id.
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employer and a third party, which is the quintessential role of an
agent.
Besides these two cases, robots currently work as agents for
principals in numerous industries, including as robo-bosses of
human employees,62 robo-guards in prisons,63 and robo-traders on
the stock market.64 Therefore, while the Restatement of Agency
could ostensibly forbid Clive from facilitating property ownership
as an agent, case law and current employment scenarios suggest
otherwise. This trend of robotic agents is likely to increase as
robots become more sophisticated,65 so Clive could legally fit into
this category of robotic agents. The Restatement of Agency simply
needs to update its definition of “person” to conform to modern
society.
Even with these above examples, these robots are simple
software that may not compare to a strong66 AI like Clive, who
could work outside his scope of employment. After all, Clive has a
mind of his own. If he determined to act outside his employment,
62

Glenn McDonald, Meet the New Boss: The World’s First ArtificialIntelligence Manager, YAHOO (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/
tech/meet-the-new-boss-the-worlds-first-128660465704.html (This “AI system
isn’t just automating routine tasks. It’s actually adjusting work orders on the
fly, basing its decisions on enormous, cumulonimbus swirls of Big Data
stored up the Cloud.”).
63
James Trew, Robo-Guard the South Korean Correction Service Robot
Says ‘Stay Out of Trouble’ (Video), ENGADGET (Apr. 15, 2012),
http://www.engadget.com/2012/04/15/robo-guard-south-korean-robotic-guard/.
64
Rob Langston, Trading in the 21st Century, R ACONTEUR (Nov. 16, 2014),
http://raconteur.net/finance/trading-in-the-21st-century. These Robo-traders
quick transactions are often referred to as “High Frequency Trading.”
65
See Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9
H ARV. J.L. & T ECH. 25, 27 (1996) (“If autonomous computers are able to learn
and modify their own behavior in this way, a reasonable implication must be
that they are capable of manifesting (or, at least, appearing to manifest) human
cognitive processes that are associated with the exercise of free will. These
processes include making choices, forming intentions, reaching decisions, and
giving or withholding consent. What follows from these AI-orientated
developments? Humans can give their computers substantial autonomy in
decision-making, thus permitting the machines to complete highly complex
tasks which involve not only the need for speed of operation but also
sophisticated, precise judgments.”).
66
See supra note 3.
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who should be liable? Current agency laws, however, can solve
this problem. If a third party reasonably believed that Clive acted
on behalf of his principal and that belief is traceable to the
principal’s manifestations, then such a principal could be held
liable67 under the same principles as McEvans and State Farm. If
no actual or apparent authority can be linked to the principal, then
the third party can sue Clive. The nature of the relationship that
exists between Clive and his principal determines the type of
compensation.68
Even with this concern over scope of employment, courts
should find it relatively easy to treat Clive as an agent to his real
estate principal. Clive does not own the real property, but is merely
assisting in a transaction. In this case, Clive is working for a
company, similar to robots already working in other fields.69
With issues over an AI working as an agent discussed, Section
B evaluates the possibility of Clive owning real property like a
corporation.

67

See RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006).
Several articles have explored possible legal remedies for artificial
intelligence. See Curtis E.A. Karnow, Liability for Distributed Artificial
Intelligences, 11 B ERKELEY T ECH. L.J. 147 (1996); see also David C. Vladeck,
Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89
W ASH. L. REV. 117 (2014); Solum, supra note 2, at 1245 (“If the AI could
insure, at a reasonable cost, against the risk that it would be found liable for
breaching the duty to exercise reasonable care, then functionally the AI would
be able to assume both the duty and the corresponding liability.”). Recently, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) has determined
that “it is more reasonable to identify the driver [of Google’s driverless cars] as
whatever (as opposed to whoever) is doing the driving. In this instance, an item
of motor vehicle equipment, the SDS [self-driving system], is actually driving
the vehicle.” Letter from Paul A Hemmersbaugh, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to
Chris Urmson, Director, Google, Inc., (Feb. 4, 2016), available at
http://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/Google%20--%20compiled%20response%20to%
2012%20Nov%20%2015%20interp%20request%20--%204%20Feb%2016%
20final.htm (explaining how Google should interpret certain provision as it
applies to it self-driving vehicles). This issue of driverless cars will become a
major legal battle for smart robots of the future to determine who or what should
be liable for damages.
69
See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text.
68
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B. Owning Property Like a Corporation
In this second hypothetical, Clive owns property similar to a
corporation. Before comparing Clive to a corporate person, it is
important to determine what that means. Corporations are artificial
persons created by the government.70 As such, they have certain
common traits. The seven common attributes of a corporation are
as follows: (1) it is a legal entity separate and apart from its
shareholders; (2) it has the capacity of continued existence
independent of the lifetime or personnel of its shareholders; (3) it
has the capacity to contract; (4) it has the capacity to own property
in its own name; (5) it has the capacity to commit torts; (6) it has
the capacity to commit crimes, but only such crimes where
criminal intent is not a necessary element of the crime; and (7) it
has the capacity to sue and be sued.71
Clive could meet all seven of these corporate attributes. First,
Clive would be a legal entity that owns property for the benefit of
his shareholders. Second, Clive is a robot, so he continues to exist
independent of his shareholder’s lifetime. Third, Clive has the
mental capabilities to sign contracts. Fourth, Clive should be able
to sign property in his name because he is acting in the same
capacity as a corporation. Fifth and sixth, given his mental
capacity, Clive could commit torts and crimes, whether by his own
actions or his agents. Seventh, Clive would be able to sue or be
sued to protect his property.
For example, if Clive existed to find dilapidated homes and flip
them for a profit, he would exist like a corporation. Clive would
continue to exist independent of his shareholders, but his goal
would be to increase their wealth. Presuming that he has
shareholders to provide him with money to invest, Clive could
independently seek out undervalued properties, sign contracts to
purchase the homes, and repair them for resale. If debris hits a
passerby as Clive is repairing a home, then the passerby could sue
Clive for his injuries. Thus, Clive works like a business to benefit
his shareholders.
70
71

See RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04(5) (2006).
K APLAN, supra note 11, at § 2:6.
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As such, the government should grant Clive artificial
personhood,72 giving him the right to own property in a manner
similar to a corporation. As the de facto CEO, Clive would manage
his own wealth-generating entity, which could range anywhere
from the structure of a regular corporation and a home flipper to a
robot that generates innovative ways to profit through property
ownership. Under this definition of personhood, however, Clive
would own property to increase the wealth of his shareholders and
must report to a board of directors. This human guardianship—like
the structure currently in place for managers of corporations 73—
would allow dual oversight by both the shareholders and the board.
Further, corporations do not have the same moral theory tied to
property rights,74 which can be seen in the limited nexus between
the corporate assets and the shareholders.75 By comparison, Clive
may even run more smoothly than a corporation managed by
humans.76 With advanced cognitive capabilities, Clive could
multitask to a much greater degree, increasing accountability and
efficiency.77 However, human oversight is still required for
corporate property owners.
While real property may be held in a corporation’s name, “the
corporation can be properly said to act only where there is a causal
nexus of actions from stockholders or board members to managers
of employees. The corporation itself does not properly act at all,”
72

The issue of legal personhood for AI robots has been addressed by
several articles. Solum, supra note 2, at 1231 (addressing the arguments against
providing artificial intelligence with personhood status); F. Patrick Hubbard,
“Do Androids Dream?” Personhood and Intelligent Artifacts, 83 T EMP. L.
REV. 405 (2011) (arguing that artificial intelligent entities should be granted
legal personhood if they have certain cognitive abilities as well as assessing
theories of personhood for artificial intelligence).
73
Managers report to their board of directors and also have duties to their
shareholders.
74
See May, supra note 16 (“Corporate property rights present an interesting
challenge to the liberal conceptions of property rights, for it is unclear the selfrespect of individuals is promoted by the existence of a system of property rights
for corporations.”).
75
Id. at 226.
76
See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 62.
77
See McDonald, supra note 62.
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but instead requires action from its human employees.78 Similarly,
Clive would be a legal person who nevertheless still requires the
human element. If a person wishes to sue corporate Clive, he may
sue the corporate AI or pierce the corporate veil. If the board of
directors allows Clive to run rampant without the proper
supervision, then a plaintiff may have better odds of piercing the
corporate veil.79 This limitation ensures that Clive’s board of
directors will not give him unlimited authority. Clive’s success
benefits the shareholders, which adheres closer to a moral theory
of benefiting individuals,80 and oversight limits foreseeable (and
unforeseeable) catastrophes.81
Without human oversight, however, Clive would own property
like a human. Section C explains issues with this approach, and
ultimately concludes that courts should not make this leap.
C. Owning Property Like a Human
In this third hypothetical, Clive may buy as much property as
he can afford, like any natural person. He has the rights to the
property, and as such, only he can face legal repercussions.82 Three
78

May, supra note 16, at 227.
Piercing the corporate veil seeks to impose “personal liability on
otherwise immune corporate officers, directors, or shareholders for the
corporation’s wrongful acts.” B LACK’S LAW D ICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
80
See May, supra note 16, at 226 (“If corporate property rights could be so
easily reduced to individual property claims of stockholders, then there is no
special problems in moral theory or legal theory posed by corporate property
rights.”).
81
Because of the speed and processing power of Clive, an error in his brain
(i.e. algorithm) can cause instantaneously devastating results. See, e.g., Gregory
Scopino¸ Do Automated Trading Systems Dream of Manipulating the Price of
Future Contracts? Policing Markets For Improper Trading Practices by
Algorithmic Robots, 67 FLA. L. REV. 221 (2015); Nick Baumann, Too Fast to
Fail: How High-Speed Trading Fuels Wall Street Disasters, MOTHER J ONES
(Jan./Feb. 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/02/high-frequencytrading-danger-risk-wall-street (discussing high frequency trading in the 2010
flash crash and warning how these advanced algorithms can cause a financial
meltdown).
82
Articles have addressed potential liability systems for Clive. See Karnow,
supra note 68; see also Vladeck, supra note 68; Gabriel Hallevy, “I Robot—I,
Criminal”—When Science Fiction Becomes Reality: Legal Liability of AI
79
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primary reasons exist to suggest that Clive should be granted rights
to own property like a natural person. However, such reasons fail
to recognize the paradigm shift that Clive presents to real property
ownership.
The first argument is that mentally incompetent natural persons
cannot own real property outright because of their cognitive
issues.83 Clive has cognitive abilities that are far beyond the
minimum mental requirements. Because this cognitive ability is an
essential part of owning real property, Clive’s rights should not be
limited. However, real property ownership is not simply about
mental abilities.84 A thirteen-year-old boy with Albert Einstein’s
IQ cannot own property without a legal guardian. On the
situation’s face, this boy should be granted these rights. Moreover,
the fears of unpredictable consequences are minimal compared to
granting Clive full ownership.85 However, the law has determined
that this boy cannot own property without legal guardianship.
Although mental capacity is a major component to ownership, it is
not the single deciding factor.
The second argument proffers since corporations can own real
property, Clive should have this right as well. Humans are
involved in corporations, but the corporation still owns the
property in its name.86 Additionally, many corporations are run
Robots Committing Criminal Offenses, 22 S YRACUSE J. SCI. & T ECH. L. 1,
(2010).
83
See Lawrence Frolik, Legal Implications of Mental Incapacity:
Guardianship & Conservatorship, SL071 ALI-ABA 67, 73–75 (2006); see also
W.J. Dunn, Legal Implications of Mental Incapacity: Guardianship &
Conservatorship, 9 A.L.R.3d 774 (1966).
84
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981); see also GA.
CODE ANN. § 44-5-119 (1990).
85
The risks caused by robots are much more significant than that of a
thirteen-year old boy. See, e.g., Elvis Picardo, Four Big Risks of Algorithmic
High-Frequency Trading, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 27, 2016, 2:13 PM),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/012716/four-big-risksalgorithmic-highfrequency-trading.asp (“Algorithmic HFT [i.e. robo-traders] has
a number of risks, the biggest of which is its potential to amplify systemic risk.
Its propensity to intensify market volatility can ripple across to other markets
and stoke investor uncertainty. Repeated bouts of unusual market volatility
could wind up eroding many investors’ confidence in market integrity.”).
86
See Barbara J. Van Arsdale, et al., 18A AM. J UR. 2 D Corporations §
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largely by robotic software without human intervention, so the
difference is minimal.87
The third argument hinges on the idea that Clive will still have
oversight even if he owns property like a natural person. The
government oversees all property and has the ability to seize any
property as long as certain factors are met.88 The Constitution only
prohibits seizing property without just compensation,89 so Clive
can be compensated. In addition, the government seizes property to
prevent dangerous conditions,90 so Clive’s property could be
seized if a danger emerged. This argument, however, creates a
blanket statement of the government’s “takings” power. This is not
true because the “takings” power is illegal unless the government
can assert direct harm.91
More importantly, the second and third arguments for granting
Clive the right to own real property discount the principles of real
property and ignore how this change represents a fundamental
paradigm shift. As discussed, real property has a moral theory
attached that promotes self-respect for people.92 Principles
espoused under the common law, the Constitution, and subsequent
legislation have contributed to advancing natural persons’ rights.93
This idea does not extend to artificial persons and has led to
624 (2016) (“Concentration of stock ownership does not alter the fact that title
to the corporate property is vested in the corporation and not in the owner of the
corporate stock, and even the fact that an individual owns all the stock of a
corporation does not make him or her the owner of its property.”).
87
See, e.g., Hayley Peterson, Wal-Mart has an Army of Robots That Pick
and Pack Your Holiday Gifts, B US. INSIDER (Dec. 13, 2013),
http://www.businessinsider.com/wal-mart-warehouse-robots-2013-12; Meet the
Robots Shipping Your Amazon Orders, T IME (Dec. 1, 2014),
http://time.com/3605924/amazon-robots/; See also McDonald, supra note 62.
88
See Penn Cent. Transp. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also
Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 307 (2007).
89
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
90
See Meltz, supra note 88, at 321.
91
See id. (“A taking claim can succeed only when the adverse impact on the
property was caused directly by the challenged government conduct. Indirect, or
“consequential,” injuries are without Takings Clause remedy.”).
92
See supra Part I.A.
93
See supra Part I.B.
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increased pushback against the idea of granting them the same
rights.94
As such, granting Clive this right would be a major shift in the
law. While corporations have a history of property ownership,
Clive would be the first of his kind. Although corporations have
developed into sophisticated artificial persons with increased rights
and power, the human element of a corporation remains a
significant distinction from Clive. Robots were initially viewed as
tools for humans. Thus, drafters of the law never considered
providing robots with the bundle of rights associated with property
ownership. It would be difficult to predict the changes in artificial
intelligence that will lead to Clive and how the law will cope with
such novel issues. However, because of the principles of real
property and the paradigm shift that Clive creates in the law, courts
should not distort the law in this situation.
CONCLUSION
Real property rights promote and protect self-respect for
individuals. This fundamental function separates it from other
types of property. Allowing Clive and other AI robots to own real
property would require that courts interpret laws in a context
Congress could never have imagined. Such a constructive
interpretation would force courts to overextend judicial discretion
and look far beyond the intent of the law. As such, Congress
should have exclusive authority.
These unintended consequences are even noticeable from the
legal creation of corporations. Corporations, as persons, gained
significant—and likely unforeseeable—rights.95 However,
94

See May, supra note 16, at 231 (“I would propose that we demote the
status of corporate property rights in our society, making the list of possible
restrictions on corporate property reflect the fact that this form of property does
not have the moral support traditionally believed to be true of other property
claims. Such a change in legal theory would not take much effort, especially
after the fiction of the corporate ‘person’ was dispensed with.”).
95
In the early 1800s, the Court found that corporations had the ability to
enter into contracts. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518
(1819). Corporations’ rights have only expanded. Now, corporations have
certain campaigning rights for elections, with legal theorists pondering the
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corporate persons remain limited by human oversight and
controlled by humans, their shareholders, and board of directors.
Even with this oversight, significant pushback already exists
concerning their increased powers.96 Several scholars have
questioned this empowering legal fiction and its potential
identity of a corporate person. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010);
Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional
Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & F IN.
L. 97 (2009). At this point, limitations seem few and far between, such as a
corporate person cannot vote in an election or marry a natural person. See
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (“Although they make enormous contributions to our society,
corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office.
Because they may be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their interests
may conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters. The
financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation of corporations
raise legitimate concerns about their role in the electoral process.”); Catherine
Traywick, Hey, They’re People Too: Seattle Woman Weds Corporation, T IME
(July 24, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/07/24/hey-theyre-people-tooseattle-woman-weds-corporation/ (stating that a woman’s marriage license to a
corporation was voided because the corporation was only 1.5 months old and
was not capable of consent). However, the two reasons given that the
corporation could not marry—too young and cannot consent—are extremely
weak since many corporations are of age and if a corporation can consent to a
contract, then why can it not consent to a marriage? While this marriage was a
ruse, it exposed the ridiculousness of the law. See also Carl J. Mayer,
Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41
H ASTINGS L.J. 577, 664–67 (1990) (providing an appendix with the Bill of
Rights and other constitutional principles granted to corporations through court
decisions).
96
See May, supra note 16. Even in the 18th century, America’s founding
fathers had concerns over corporations’ rights. See Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789) (opposing the continuation of
contracts prior to the founding of the United States of America, explaining that
“no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth
belongs always to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what
proceeds from it, as they please, during their usufruct. . . [but if person could]
eat up the usufruct of the lands for several generations to come, and then the
lands would belong to the dead, and not to the living, which would be reverse of
our principle.”). Currently, corporations, which are headed by natural persons, at
least “eat up” the estates. President Jefferson’s words ring even louder today
when dealing with potential artificially intelligent life forms having the ability to
perpetually “eat up” real property.
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problems.97 Even so, the rights granted to corporations open the
doors wide for artificial persons such as Clive to receive similar
rights. It would be difficult for courts to find that Clive does not
meet the legal criteria for corporate personhood.98 Therefore,
similar to a corporation, Clive should be able to own real property
with legal guardianship. This legal guardianship can come in the
form of a board of directors, managers, shareholders, or all of the
above.
Courts accept that corporations can own property for the
benefit of their natural persons. Without the shareholders or human
managers, the corporation transforms its identity, a transformation
that courts should construe to have legal limitations. Thus, Clive
should be granted legal rights under hypotheticals one and two—
Clive should be able to work as an agent for a principal or act as
the principal itself, like a corporation.
PRACTICE POINTERS


Robots currently act as agents in various industries and
courts can find a business liable for their actions, even
without any actual contractual agreement by a human
counterpart.



Courts have interpreted personhood loosely for artificially
created business entities.



The rights attributed to artificial persons should guide
future decisions of innovative smart technologies.

97

See Mayer, supra note 95, at 650 (“Behind doctrines of commercial
property and the free market of ideas is hidden the tacit acceptance of the
corporation as a person, entitled to all the rights of real humans.”); see also
David Fagundes, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The
Language of A Legal Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1750 (2001) (“That
‘[the] corporation is a person’ remains one of the most enduring and problematic
legal fictions”.); May, supra note 16, at 231; see also Citizens United, 558 U.S.
at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Under
the majority’s view, I suppose it may be a First Amendment problem that
corporations are not permitted to vote, given that voting is, among other things,
a form of speech.”).
98
See supra Part II.B.

